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Managerial Perceptions and 
The Normative Model of Strategy Formulation 
ABSTRACT 
The normative model of strategy formulation has long been popular. 
However, its validity may be questioned. For example, some literature 
suggests that managers' perceptions of strengths and weaknesses and of 
their firm's external environment (both important in the normative strategy 
formulation model) may ·vary by management level. Differences likely result 
because of individuals' cognitive schemas, which include their cognitive 
bia·ses. In turn, systematic errors may occur in managerial decisions. 
Results from the research reported herein support the notion that managers' 
perceptions of a firm's strengths and weaknesses and of environmental 
uncertainty vary by managerial level. Differences in these perceptions 
were discovered to be more significant within each firm. These results 
suggest the need to evaluate how the normative approach to strategy for-
mulation is used in firms that solicit inputs from .individuals occupying 
different managerial levels. 
Introduction 
From a normative perspective, the formulation of strategy is seen by some 
(e.g., Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Andrews, 1980; Porter, 1980) to begin with 
assessments of a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses and its external 
opportunities and threats. While popular, this is not the only perspective on 
formulation of strategies. In fact, some (e.g., Mintzberg, 1973, 1978; Bower 
and Doz, 1979; Quinn, 1980) argue that the normative view may be oversimplified 
or even inaccurate as a description of strategy formulation pro~esses. Huff 
(1982) suggests that the influence of. a firm's experiences in a particular 
industry setting may shape strategy formulation processes significantly. As 
such, the nature of formal strategy formulation processes may be altered 
substantially. Nonetheless, the normative view continues to influence strongly 
both the teaching of and research into strategy formulation activities. With 
respect to teaching, established textbooks (e.g., Newman and Logan, 1981; 
Christensen, Andrews, Bower, Hammermesh, and Porter, 1982) promote the normative 
model. In terms of research, several methodologies that can be used to conduct 
external environmental analyses appear in the literature (e.g., Porter, 1980; 
Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). Few studies, however, have examined approaches and 
techniques used to assess a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses. This lack 
of research is noteworthy, since identification of strengths and weaknesses is 
considered to be a critical, initial step in the normative view of strategy for-
mulation processes (Higgins, 1983). 
Because of the paucity of research, very little is known about how organiza-
tional strengths and weaknesses are actually determined and by whom. In this 
current study, it is proposed that the assessment process can not be separated 
from the assessor(s). Evidence is presented supporting the position that actual 
assessments of strengths and weaknesses will ~ary substantially a~ong and within 
different management levels. Stated differently, it is possible that 
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assessments and the assessment processes are, to some degree, a product of the 
assessor(s). As such, the accuracy and/or appropriateness of assessments that 
serve as inputs to a firm's strategy formulation process may be subject to 
debate. In addition, it suggests that research into strategy formulation pro-
cesses should be sensitive to the perceiver and how the individual perceptions 
are factored into the outcome. A similar view was advanced by Pearce (1983) who 
argued that relative orientations toward examinations of internal and external 
environmental factors is a product of the individual. This perspective differs 
somewhat, Pearce (1983) argued, from the traditional one which suggests that per-
sons outside a firm should be appointed as board members to assure a proper 
orientation to external environmental conditions. 
Several objectives were pursued in conducting this study. First, the 
researchers sought to establish that assessments of a firm's strengths and 
weaknesses can be expected to vary systematically and substantially among mana-
gerial levels. Recent research in cognitive psychology, coupled with 
established literature in organizational theory, support this expected outcome. 
A second objective was to subject this expectation to empirical examination. 
This was accomplished with data collected from separate managerial levels in 
three different firms. A final objective was to examine how a key environmental 
component--perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU)--affects these rela-
tionships. PEU was included in this design since the concept occupies a central 
position in several research literatures and evidence suggests that it may 
affect relationships evaluated in this study. Implications of the results are 




In this section, relevant research and theory are reviewed and hypotheses 
established. 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
Only one major systematic study of how organizations define strengths and 
weaknesses has been completed (Stevenson, 1976). In his research, Stevenson 
asked fifty managers, from six companies, for their evaluation of corporate 
strengths and weaknesses and the reasons underlying the evaluations. The 
sample was structured to yield a relatively broad representation of managers 
within each firm. From his informal analysis of 191 responses to an open ended 
research question he concluded that: 
The .results of the study brought into serious question the 
value of formal assessment approaches. It was found that 
an individual's cognitive perceptions of the strengths and 
weaknesses of his organization were strongly influenced by 
factors associated with the individual and not only by the 
organization's attributes. Position in the organization, 
perceived role, and type of responsibility so strongly in-
fluenced the assessment that the objective reality of the 
situation tended to be overwhelmed. In addition there were 
wide variations among standards of measurement and criteria 
for judgment employed. (p. 55) 
While potentially interesting, Stevenson's methodology creates some concern 
regarding the findings' validity. No statistical analyses were conducted to 
determine the significance of the differences found. Simple percentages of par-
tic~lar responses were tabulated and informal comparisons made. A second con-
cern is that a simple verbal or written response to a question may not be 
accurate. Decision makers' descriptions of their own policies often are inac-
curate (Hoffman, 1960; Slavic, 1969; Balke, Hammond & Meyer, 1973). Similarly, 
stated policies and intentions often vary from what is actually used. Argyris 
and Schon (1974) describe this as the difference between ''espoused theories" of 
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action and "theories in use" that actually govern behavior. These researchers 
suggest that a person's "theory in use" cannot be obtained simply by asking for 
it. Rather, it must be constructed by observing and recording the person's 
behavior in the situation under question. Stated differently, what people say 
in response to the question, "What are your firm's strengths and weaknesses?" 
may be different from the set of believed strengths and weaknesses they use in 
making actual strategic decisions. 
As noted, Stevenson's (1976) work is the only major study to examine how 
strengths and weaknesses are assessed in organizations. However, a similar con-
cept (distinctive competencies) has been investigated by Snow and Hrebiniak 
0980). This concept was operationalized originally by Selznick 0957), who 
suggested that a distinctive competence represents those things that an organi-
zation does especially well in comparison to its competitors. This definition, 
or a slight variant, remains an integral component of strategy researchers' 
(e.g., Schendel and Hofer, 1978; Grant and King, 1982; Hitt and Ireland, 1984) 
frame-works. In essence, a distinctive competence may be thought of as a subset 
of a firm's strengths. It is the set of strengths that determine what an orga-
nization can perform especially well in comparison to its competitors and that 
can be manipulated effectively to achieve a competitive advantage. 
Snow and Hrebiniak 0980) found that managerial perceptions of distinctive 
competencies may vary within organizations. These researchers also charac-
terized distinctive competencies within strategic business units in their sample 
of 88 firms. This was done through analysis of perceptions of managers in their 
sample. Hitt and Ireland 0984) also relied on upper-level managerial percep-
tions to examine corporate level distinctive competencies in 185 firms. 
However, results from both studies are restricted to perceptions from only upper 
level managers. 
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Assessment of the Environment 
Although only a few studies have focused on issues relevant to the iden-
tification of organizational strengths and weaknesses, assessments of external 
environmental conditions have been examined more frequently (e.g., Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). Research focusing on external assessment processes has been 
categorized by Bourgeois ( 1980). Results appearing in both the strategic man-
agement and organizational theory literatures were included in his analysis. 
Among the most important of these research efforts are the seminal studies of 
Lawren.ce and Lorsch 0967) and Emery and Trist (1965). These researchers found 
that a firm's actions are affected significantly by individuals' perceptions of 
degrees of environmental uncertainty. Included within the range of organiza-
tional actions affected by perceived environmental uncertainty is the assessment 
of external environments. In view of this and other evidence recorded in the 
literature, some (e.g., Duncan, 1972; Downey, Hell riegel and Slocum, 1975; 
Boulton, Lindsay, Franklin and Rue, 1982; Hitt, Ireland and Palia, 1982) have 
concluded that PEU is indeed a significant environmental variable. As an indi-
cation of this importance, PEU was one of the key environmental variables 
Bourgeois 0980) suggested should be examined when studying corporate actions. 
Similarly, Hambrick (1981) noted that both strategy and environment are crucial 
contingencies for organizations. In fact, these two variables are inextricably 
interwoven. For example, Lindsay and Rue (1980) and, to a lesser extent, 
Boulton et al. (1982) found environmental uncertainty to be related to a firm's 
strategic planning processes. Similarly, Dirsmith and Covaleski (1983) found 
that the environment exerts a strong influence on a firm's strategic norms. 
Given this evidence, it may not be surprising that Hrebiniak and Snow (19.80) 
discovered interrelationships between perceptions of enviromental uncertainty 
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and intraorganizational influence. Thus, the degree of PEU may affect strategic 
planning processes as well as norms and perceptions of internal strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Despite its significance, concerns regarding how PEU is conceptualized and 
operationalized have surfaced. For example, Downey and Ireland 0979) argued 
that assessors' perceptions can be measured either quantitatively or qualita-
tively. Similarly, the assessor can be asked to evaluate either quantitative or 
qualitative environmental attributes specified by the researcher. All combi-
nations of these variables may be appropriate for use. The challenge is for 
the researcher to be aware of the outcome sought. In the current study, man-
agers were asked to evaluate quantitative measures of qualitative environmental 
attributes. 
Perceptions of environmental uncertainty may also vary by managerial level. 
Cox, Hitt and Stanton (1978) found PEU to vary by an administrator's hierarchi-
cal level (top, middle or lower). These differences may be accounted for in the 
context of the jobs at each managerial level and by managers' previous experi-
ences. Each managerial level is assigned unique responsibilities that should be 
consistent with the scope of both the firm's activities and its relevant exter-
nal environment. The scope enlarges as one progresses to the top of the man-
agerial hierarchy. In addition, Kiesler and Sproull (1982) note that each 
manager has distinctive experiences, and that he/she will tend to overgeneralize 
the extent to which a few similar attributes of a current situation represent an 
analogue to past experiences. Since managers at each level are more likely to 
have similar experiences but differences (at least in extent) in experiences 
between levels, individuals' perceptions of environmental uncertainty may vary. 
Finally, Thompson (1967) hypothesized that organizations seek to seal off or 
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buffer their technical cores from environmental influences. This suggests that 
managers in the technical core (generally lower level managers) may be relative-
ly naive with respect to external environmental conditions. 
In suuunary, the literature suggests that perceived environmental uncertainty 
influences strategic processes (e.g., determination of strengths and weaknesses) 
and that these influences may vary by managerial level. 
Cognition and Varying Perceptions 
Individuals' basic, cognitive properties result in perceptions of the 
environment and of internal strengths and weaknesses. These perceptions may 
vary as a function of managerial level in the organization. 
These differences suggest that managers should not be viewed as "faceless 
abstractions," but as individuals with multiple characteristics (e.g., age, per-
sonal history, values and education). These characteristics may vary signifi.-
cantly across managers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Given their individuality, 
managers bring somewhat unique perspectives to processes used to evaluate the 
organization and its internal and external environments. Few organizational 
events are approached by a manager as being totally unique and requiring syste-
matic analytical study. Instead, they are processed through preexisting 
knowledge systems. Known as schemasl, (see Norman, 1976, for a discussion of 
sch~mas), these systems represent beliefs, theories and propositions that have 
developed over time based on the manager's personal experiences. At a broader 
unit of analysis, Huff (1982) implied the possibility that organizations' 
lBrief and Downey (1983) discuss the role "implicit theories" play in the 
structuring of organizations. While differences do exist, a manager's schemas 
and his/her implicit theories tap -similar dimensions of an individual's cognL-
ti ve makeup. 
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actions can be characterized as schemas. An organizational schema is primarily 
a product of managers' interpretations of experiences while operating within 
certain industries. 
Schemas permit managers to categorize an event, assess its consequences, and 
consider appropriate actions (including doing nothing) and to do so rapidly and 
often efficiently~ Without schemas, a manager, and ultimately the organizations 
with which he/she is associated, would become paralyzed by the need to analyze 
"scientifically" an enormous number of ambiguous and uncertain situations. In 
other words, managers must be able to scan environments selectively so that 
timely decisions can be made (Hambrick, 1982). The selection of environmental 
elements to be scanned is likely affected by a manager's schema. 
Unfortunately, schemas are not infallible guides to. the organization and its 
environments. In fact, some are relatively inaccurate representations of the 
world, particularly as conditions change. Furthermore, events often are not 
labeled accurately _and sometimes are processed through inaccurate and/or 
incomplete knowledge structures. 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to understand what 
managers' schemas actually represent. Kiesler and Sproul 0982) offer the 
following concise description: 
Managers operate on mental representations of the world and 
those representations are likely to be of histori~al environ-
ments rather than of current ones. (p. 557) 
It is this experiential or historical nature that is critical. Simply put, it 
is likely that perceptions of strengths and weaknesses and the external environ-
ment will vary systematically across managerial levels. The variance may be 
expected since managers' mental representations of conditions probably will be 
historical in nature and the historical experiences on which they are based 
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likely have varied across managerial levels. This is not to say that managers 
at each level share a common overall history, but rather that they often have 
some significant common historical experiences that vary across levels. As a 
result, measurable differences in perceptions across levels may be anticipated. 
For example, managers at each organizational level will tend, on the average, to 
be near the same age. Age variance across levels will be significantly greater 
than within levels (Hall, 1976; Veiga, 1981). Being of roughly the same age, 
cohort managers at each level will tend to have similar life experiences and 
resultant values and beliefs (stored as schemas). For example, few would argue 
that people who were draft age during the Second World War and people who were 
draft age during the Vietnam War tend to have, on the average, values and 
perspectives about war . (stored as schemas) that differ significantly. In other 
words, different cohorts have different schemas simply as a result of different 
experience bases that are a product of broad social trends and events. Consider 
the case of "participative management." Younger professionals (those under 35) 
are more likely to see the absence of participative management as a weakness of 
the organization than are older professionals (those over 55) (Business Week, 
July 2, 1984). 
Furthermore, members of each managerial level are likely to be near the same 
organizational age (i.e., to have been members of the organization or a similar 
one for about the same period of time). This suggests that they probably have 
experienced similar histories of organizational event.s. Stated differently, the 
organizational history on which various schemas are based will tend to be simi-
lar within each managerial level and tend to vary across managerial levels 
(e.g., at higher levels schemas will be based on a longer historial organiza-
tional tecord). 
A second, general reason why perceptions of strengths and weaknesses and 
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environmental uncertainty are likely to vary as a function of managerial level 
is the concept of cognitive biases. The psychology of cognitive biases is the 
study of how people (managers), in making decisions, sometimes make systematic 
(and often severe) errors (Tversky arid Kahneman's [1974] work is an excellent 
introduction to and survey of this literature). When dealing with uncertain and 
complex tasks, people (managers) often rely on a limited number of heuristic 
principles. Doing so simplifies the decision process significantly. In 
general, these heuristics are useful, but on some occasions they can result in 
critical errors. Recent evidence suggests that this may occur often in man-
agerial selection decisions (Hitt and Barr, 1984). Reliance on a limited number 
of heuristics in making strategic deiisions could be disasterous. 
For the purposes of this research, the most important of these heuristics 
may be the availability one (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1973 for a thorough 
discussion). Basically, this heuristic leads people to make decisions by using 
information that can be brought to the mind easily (i.e., information that is 
"available"). For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) indicate that one may 
assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling such 
occurrences among one's acquaintances, even if it can be demonstrated that it is 
an inappropriate basis for drawing such a conclusion. In the present case, it 
seems that the information that is "available" will vary by managerial level. 
In general, this occurs because managers at different levels tend to concentrate 
on different tasks and hence, deal with different sets of information. ~or 
example, a plant inventory manager (typically a lower level managerial position) 
is likely to have a great deal of information related to inventories available 
to him. This information would be almost totally obscured at the corporate 
level. By contrast, top managers are likely to have significant amounts of 
information regarding cash flow. These data would not .be as relevant at lower 
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managerial levels. 
Similarly, there may be some differences in the types of information man-
agers in different organizations seek. These differences may be attributed 
largely to different industries and the types of information most critical in 
each industry setting. 
Closely related to the concept of availability is the concept of salience. 
As Kiesler and Sproul (1982) state: 
••• people attend to and encode salient material--events that 
are unpleasant, deviant, extreme, intense, unusual, sudden, 
brightly lit, colorful, alone, or sharply drawn ••• In sum, 
salient information has greater weight in the determinance 
of what is remembered and how well it is organized. (p. 556) 
Hence, salience is likely to determine how well remembered and organized (i.e., 
how "available") information is. What is salient at one level may be totally 
irrelevant at another. For example, at the lower levels of management, events 
or information, such as low or high morale of production employees, loss of an 
account because of quality problems, an unfair dismissal, and a new machining 
center, are likely to be salient. In contrast, examples of salient events or 
information at the top management level would include: a sudden drop in stock 
price, a loss of market share, a change in the ·bonus plan, and a change in 
government antitrust policy. 
Hypotheses 
The evidence evaluated herein suggests two hypotheses and one research 
question. 
Hypothesis 1: Perceptions of strength and weakness indicators vary by 
management level (top, middle, and lower). 
Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of environmental uncertainty vary by management 
level (top, middle, and lower). 
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Research Question: Is perceived environmental uncertainty a moderator of 
the relationship between strength and weakness indicators and firm effec-
tiveness, as perceived by managers? 
The hypotheses and research question are important, for several reasons. 
For example, if perceptions do vary, questions of "true," "best," "appropriate" 
or "weighted" (what weighting?) perceptions become important. How should 
researchers measure PEU? How should a planning process be designed to account 
for differences in perceptions? How can perceptual variance be reduced, or 
should it? Confirmation of the hypotheses suggests that these questions and 
others become significant issues for future research. The view that only top 
management perceptions are important in strategy formulation processes is 
naive. Research conducted by Bower (1970), Prahalad (1976) and Burgleman 
(1983), among others, has established that the entire strategy formulation pro-
cess is diffuse and involves several management levels. 
Method 
Sample 
Data were collected from top, middle, and appropriate lower-level managers 
from three firms among the largest 500 companies in South America. Two firms 
were headquartered in Venezuela, one in Brazil. Three different industries 
(oil tools, petrochemical and brewing) were represented. The sample included 56 
managers: 12 top managers; 24 middle managers; and 20 lower-level managers 
(only lower-level managers with input into and/or involvement with the strategic 
planning process were included). Of these 56 managers, 31 were from the oil 
tools firm (7 top, 6 middle, 18 lower), 21 from the brewing firm (4 top, 15 
middle, 2 lower), and four from the petrochemical firm (1 top, 3 middle). The 
differential~ relative proportions from each firm reflect the approach used 
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in the strategic planning process and firm structures. For example, all 
management levels are highly involved in strategic planning in the oil tools 
firm. However, the strategic planning process in the petrochemical firm is more 
centralized with involvement of only key management staff. 
Many of the managers sampled were educated in the U.S. and most had attended 
management development seminars on strategic planning processes. Each of the 
firms uses a "normative" strategic planning process. Thus, although some 
cultural differences may exist, this group of managers and firms provides a 
representative sample of how managers apply the normative strategy formulation 
process. 
Data Collection Procedure 
Analysis of internal factors (strength and weakness indicators) used by 
managers in determining strategic actions required a procedure to define the 
factors utilized accurately. Stevenson 0976) conducted personal interviews. 
However, as noted previously, evidence exists suggesting that managers' descrip-
tions of factors used in making decisions may be inaccurate (Hoffman, 1960; 
Slovic, 1969; Balke, Hammond & Meyer, 1973). Similarly, Hambrick 0982) 
suggested that managers may be unable to describe their actual, environmental 
scanning behaviors accurately. Argyris and Schon (1974) argue that, in these 
instances, a procedure must be used to capture "theories in use" rather than 
"espoused theories." 
The policy-capturing procedure (Slavic and Lichtenstein, 1971; Slovic, 
Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 1977) used to obtain a major part of the data 
(decision factors used in determining strategic actions) satisfies the concern 
raised by Argyris and Schon (1974). Policy capturing has been used succes~fully 
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in similar instances (e.g., Hitt & Middlemist, 1979; Hitt, Ireland, Keats & 
Vianna, 1983). Use of this procedure requires that a comprehensive list of 
decision factors (strength and weakness indicators, in this instance) be iden-
tified. A panel of four Latin American managers, each with extensive experience 
in strategic management, was used to develop a list of possible decision fac-
tors. Stevenson's (1976) compilation served as a foundation. Based on the 
pan.e 1 members' experiences and knowledge sets, some factors were added while 
others were deleted. The final list included 21 factors (as shown in Table 1) 
that may be important indicators of a firm's health (based on internal 
evaluations). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
The policy capturing_~procedure specifies that managerial decisions be 
observed so that models of the factors used in the decisions and their respec-
tive importance weightings can be developed. Doing this requires that descrip-
tions of multiple simulated firms be developed in terms of the indicators of 
firm health (decision factors) varying the levels of these indicators. Once 
developed, managers are asked to assume that the simulated firm's objectives, 
products and technologies are similar to those of their own firm. Each 
simulated firm is then to be examined and its effectiveness evaluated. Treating 
the effectiveness ratings as dependent variables and the 21 indicators (with 
levels varying between each case) as independent variables, regression models 
can be constructed denoting the decision factors used in the managers' effec-
tiveness evaluations and their weightings. 
Thirty simulated cases were developed in whieh the lev~ls of the i ndependent 
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variables were randomly varied on a scale of one (poor), two (bad), three 
(average), four (good), five (excellent). The random assignment of levels of 
the independent variables was designed to control for researcher bias and poten-
tial collinearity. This procedure is described fully in Hitt and Middlemist 
(1979) and Hitt et al. (1983). A sample case is shown in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
The number of cases was limited to 30 for reasons of response practicality. 
Managers were given the thirty cases and were instructed to rate the effec-
tiveness of each firm on a scale of one (very inef~ective) to seven (very 
effective). They were asked to rate the effectiveness of each firm based on the 
indicator levels presented in each case. The managers were told that the indi-
cator levels were determined by a managerial audit. Previous research suggests 
that managers search for the indicators most important to their own strategic 
actions, observe the indicator levels presented in the case, and decide on the 
simulated firm's effectiveness (Hitt and Middlemist, 1979). 
Each manager completed an effectiveness rating for 30 simulated firms, 
yielding a sample size of 30 x 56 or 1680 observations. This procedure is 
almost identical to a repeated measures design. Precedent exists for the 
assumption that each case represents an independent observation (Stewart & 
Gelberd, 1972; Hitt & Middlemist, 1979; Hitt et al., 1983). 
Indicator Independence 
The random assignment of indicator levels should disallow collinearity among 
the independent variables, thereby avoiding the effect found by Dudycha and 
Naylor 0966) [that interrelationships among decision cues (indicators in this 
16 
research) affected raters' judgments]. An intercorrelation matrix was 
constructed to examine the independence among the indicators. The matrix shows 
the bivariate Pearson product-moment correlations for each pairing of 21 indica-
tors over the 30 cases (n • 30). 
As shown in Table 3, the highest r between any pair of indicators was .49 
yielding a highest common variance of .24. Furthermore, 98 percent of the pair-
wise r's were below .4 and 87 percent were below .3. The lack of collinearity 
lends more credence to the decision models derived. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
A second data set acquired through the managers' responses concerned per-
ceived environmental uncertainty. The Miles and Snow 0978) PEU instrument, 
modified for the Latin American environment, was used to collect these data. As 
used in this research, the instrument contained six scales, composed of 25 
items, that measured perceived uncertainty in six major dimensions of a firm's 
external environment: (1) suppliers of raw materials and parts; (2) 
competitors' behavior; (3) clients; (4) financial/capital markets; (5) govern-
ment regulatory agency actions; and (6) behavior of labor unions. 
Managers were asked to evaluate the predictability of each item of the 
environment on a seven-point Likert-type scale. Means from each of the six 
scales were obtained and summed for the total PEU scale. To assess instrument 
reliability, coeffi.cient alphas were calculated for each scale. All coefficient 
alphas were acceptable except for the "clients" scale. However, elimination of 
one item resulted in an ~cceptable coefficient for the scale. The six coef-
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ficient alphas were: suppliers of raw materials and parts (.69); competitors' 
behavior (.66); clients (.60); financial/capital markets (.75); government regu-
latory agency actions (.89); and behavior of labor unions (.78). 
Results 
Individual decision models were examined first to insure the effort and con-
sistency of each subject manager. Hitt and Middlemist (1979) and Hitt et al. 
(1983) used the heuristic of R2 > .40 for inclusion of individual models in 
further analyses. Hitt and Middlemist (1979) conducted post hoc analyses that 
supported the appropriateness of this heuristic. This heuristic was also used 
in this study. Stepwise linear regression analysis, with the effectiveness 
ratings as the dependent variable and indicator values as the independent 
variables, was used to develop individual decision models. Slavic et al. 0977) 
concluded that the linear model · does a remarkably good job of predicting human 
judgments. The criterion for inclusion of indicator variables in the model was 
p < • 05. 
Only one individual manager's model (R2 • .134) failed to satisfy the 
heuristic. All other individual manager's models had R2's greater than .40. 
The highest individual model R2 was .955. Excluding the one data set with an R2 
< .40 resulted in a sample size of 55 managers and 1650 observations. 
The next step in the analysis was to develop a regression model (in 
stepwise fashion) for the combined sample of 55 managers and 1650 obaervations. 
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 4. There were 12 statistically 
significant indicator variables and the model had an R2 = .375. The strongest 
predictor in the combined model was "the planning system." An R2 = .375 with 
individual model R2's greater than .40 indicates only moderate agreement among 
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the managers. Differences may exist by management level and/or environmental 
uncertainty. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Management Level 
Regression models were developed to examine the important strength and 
weakness indicators for each management level. Results of these analyses are 
shown in Table 5. The regression models for top managers and for lower-level 
managers show some improvement (gains in R2) over the aggregate managerial 
model. However, there seems to be less consistency among middle managers. 
Comparing the models across management levels suggests some differences (e.g., 
the organizational form and structure indicator appears only in the lower-level 
management model while the distribution channels indicator appears only in the 
top management model). Weights of the indicators also varied between models; 
however, the differences were not large. Therefore, further analyses were 
necessary. Regression models were developed for each management level within 
each firm. Results of these analyses are shown in Tables 6, 7, and 8. In these 
models differences by level become more distinct. There.were four of fourteen 
indicators used that were common in all managerial models in the oil tools firm. 
Only one indicator out of eleven used was common to all models in the brewery. 
No common indicators among the two managerial models in the petrochemical firm 
were found. Weights and signs of some of the common indicators (in two or three 
models) also varied across managerial models within firms. The model R2's were 
higher in most cases for the top management and lower-level managers within 
firms. Middle-level manager models were the least consistent. In total, 
results from these analyses support hypothesis 1. 
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Insert Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 about here 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
Based on previous use of the construct and research evidence cited pre-
viously, environmental uncertainty, as perceived by managers, may be expected to 
vary by firm, since the firms were in different industries and one was located 
in a country different from the other two firms. Mean PEU scores for managers 
from each firm were: oil tools (X = 21. 22); brewery (X = 18.15); and petrochem-
ical (X • 21.63) (F = 4.10, p < .OS). The ANOVA shows statistically signifi-
cant variance among the mean PEU scores. However, Duncan's multiple range test, 
used to examine where those differences occurred, failed to show significant 
differences by firm. The only element in the environment where differences were 
detectable regarded the "clients" dimension. The brewery managers had statisti-
cally significant lower perceived uncertainty with clients (X • 2.33) than 
either oil tools managers (X"' 4.33) or petrochemical managers (X= 4.05 (F "" 
20 • 91 ' p < • 0 1 ) • 
Although few differences in PEU were found by firm, differences in PEU by 
management level were detected in the ANOVA. The mean PEU scores by management 
level were: lower-level managers (X • 22.19); middle managers (X • 18.48); and 
top managers (X= 20.15) (F • 4.96, p < .02). 
Major differences existed by management level in the perceived uncertainty 
of "clients" (F = 7.01, p < .02), "financial markets" (F = 2.86, p < .07) and 
"labor unions" (F = 2.90, p < .07). Results of Duncan's multiple range test 
appear in Table 9. ~s shown, lower-level managers perceived more general 
environmental uncertainty than middle-level managers, but not as compared to 
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top-level managers. Lower-level managers perceived more environmental uncer-
tainty in the "clients" dimension than top or middle managers. Lower-level 
managers perceived more uncertainty in the financial markets than middle man-
agers. Finally, · top managers perceived more environmental uncertainty with labor 
unions than middle managers. These results support hypothesis 2. 
Insert Table 9 about here 
Given the results suggesting that perceptions of both strength and weakness 
indicators and PEU vary by management level, it was important to determine if 
PEU influences the strength and weakness indicators seen as important by man-
agers. Therefore, analyses were designed to test if PEU moderated the rela-
tionship between strength and weakness indicators (independent variables) and 
managerial ratings of firm effectiveness (dependent variable). 
Moderated regression analysis was used to test the moderating effect of PEU. 
This analysis yields a conservative estimate of the moderating effects one 
variable has on the relationship between two or more other variables (Darrow & 
Kahl, 1983). The dependent variable is regressed on a set of predictor 
variables, a hypothesized moderator variable and a cross -product of thepre-
ceding terms (y · · a+ bx + cz + dxz), where y is the dependent variable, xis 
the independent variable, z is a hypothesized moderator variable and xz is the 
interaction term (Bedeian, Mossholder, & Armenakis, 1983). The purpose is to 
determine if the addition of the interaction term increases the explanation of 
the variance (R2) in the dependent variable significantly. 
Results of the moderated regression analysis are shown in Table 10. The 
difference in R2 between the restricted (y = a + bx + cz) and full (y = a + bx + 
cz + dxz) models was tested using the procedure recommended by Cohen 0968). As 
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shown, the difference in R2 was statistically significant. However, the dif-
ference in R2 was small (1.3 percent). Stone (1976) noted that moderating 
effects of approximately one percent are negligible. Therefore, PEU's 
moderating effect may be considered insignificant. As a result, additional 
analyses were unnecessary. 
_____________ .... ______________ _ 
Insert Table 10 about here 
DISCUSSION 
The normative view of strategy formulation processes has been examined 
extensively.2 Horovitz 0984) conclud~d that much more is known about these 
processes than those associated with strategy implementation. 
Although popular, the validity of the normative view has been questioned. 
Mintz berg ( 1973; 1978), Bower and Doz (1979), Bourgeois ( 1980), and Quinn (1980) 
are among those suggesting deficiencies in the norm~tive view. More recently, 
Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) summarized many of these concerns. 
The research study reported herein focused on one component included in the 
normative approach to the formulation of strategies. While some debate might 
surface, most would agree that the identification of a firm's internal strengths 
and its weakness is critical in the formulation of a strategy. Some (e.g., 
Higgins~ 1983) suggest that it is the first activity that should be completed 
and others (e.g., Hitt and Ireland, in press) argue that strengths and 
2In a recent work, Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) discussed the contribu-
tions key studies have made to what they labeled the "Strategy Formulation 
School." 
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weaknesses must be identified at both the corporate and business unit levels in 
the multibusiness firm. The position adopted herein is that lack of full 
knowledge regarding appropriate application of the normative formulation pro-
cess, and not the process itself, may account for concerns raised by Mintzberg 
0973; 1978) and others. More directly, this research was conducted to examine 
the possibility that the strengths and weaknesses identified by managers at dif-
ferent levels within given firms are influenced by individuals cognitive sche~ 
mas, biases and the information available to them. Similarly, these 
individualized-characteristics may affect the environmental uncertainty per-
ceived by managers operating at different levels within an organization. 
Results of this research suggest that the normative approach to the for-
mulation of strategies may not be an appropriate descriptive model. With addi-
tional knowledge, firms may be able to execute superior strategy formulation 
processes. While the same reasonin.g possibly could apply to other parts of 
the normative strategy formulation process, this research focused only on 
attempts to identify a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses. 
Variance of strensths and weaknesses' indicators .£l managerial level 
The first hypothesis suggested that perceptions of strengths and 
weaknesses' indicators would be different among three managerial levels. Viewed 
jointly, the results suppport ~his hypothesis. 
The overall regression model showed only moderate agreement among managers. 
The regression models for each of the management levels showed some agreement as 
well as differences. Six indicators (the interest and abilities demonstrated by 
top management, the planning system, the abilities of employees, knowledge of 
client's needs, services provided to clients and information on market share) 
were common in each of the regression models for top, middle and lower level 
23 
managers (although the indicator weightings varied among the models). The 
importance of these six indicators should perhaps be expected. As a whole, they 
reflect the firm's needs to evaluate external conditions, the necessity of 
understanding the needs expressed by the firm's clients and the role a planning 
system and top level managers' skills and commitments play in a firm's perfor-
mance. 
With respect to other indicators, differences were found. For example, pro-
duct quality and the price-earnings index were shown to be important indicators 
for top and lower level managers, but not for middle level managers. It is not 
surprising that product quality was selected as a critical indicator. Those at 
the top level must justify the quality of their firm's product to external 
constituencies. In the United States, for example, we have seen Lee Iacocca 
appear orr national television and challenge consumers to buy an automobile 
superior in quality to the Chrysler product, if one can be located. Similarly, 
the Ford Motor Company now suggests that "quality is job #1" in its firm. For 
lower level managers, product quality is ne-cessary since the technical core (the 
area for which these individuals are responsible) often is buffered (Thompson, 
1967) to assure successful operations. In a similar manner, the importance of 
the price-earnings index as a strength and weakness indicator for a top level 
manager is understandable. However, this indicator was weighted more heavily by 
the lower level managers. This finding simply may reflect an appreciation 
for the importance of an often-used financial performance measure and the 
influence the index may have on a firm's future. The fact that neither one of 
these indicators were found to be important by middle level managers is 
interesting. This finding may be a product of the primary responsiblilty 
assigned to middle level managers. l'hese individuals typically must voi.ce con-
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cerns of those below them to top level managers while simultaneously assuring 
that top level managers' desired strategies and actions are implemented by those 
operating in the firm's technical core. Perhaps this "coordinating/integrating" 
responsibility results in less attention being paid to the firm's actual output 
(i.e., the quality of the product produced) and external judgements (e.g., the 
price-earnings index) of the firm's performance. Thus, the lower agreement 
among middle managers regarding importance indicators may reflect the varia-
bility in their jobs and responsibilities. 
Another example of differences among managerial levels is the lower level 
managers' selection of two indicators (organizational form and structure and 
employee activities) not chosen by other managers. This suggests that the 
manner in which work roles are segmented and then recombined, along with the 
distribution of power across these roles (Galbraith and Nathanson; 1978) affects 
lower level managers significantly. Clearly, their subordinates respond to 
structural configurations. Apparently then, those who select structural forms 
(top level managers) and those who assure their implementation (middle level 
mangers) believe they are less important strength or weakness indicators for 
a firm. 
Differences among mangerial levels within each firm were also examined. 
These results suggested greater variances by managerial level in the perception 
of a firm's strengths and weaknesses indicators. In the oil tools firm, for 
example, only four indicators (the interest and abilities demonstrated by top 
management, the planning system, knowledge of client's needs and information on 
market share) were selected by managers at all three levels. In total, fourteen 
indicators appeared in these managers' models. Of greater interest is the fact 
that four other incidators were chosen only by lower level managers, while three 
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others were included only in middle level managers' models. 
The diversity is even more pronounced among subjects in the brewery and the 
petrochemical firms. Only one indicator (the planning system) appeared in all 
three managerial levels' models in the brewery firm. Three indicators were 
common to top and middle level managers. Interestingly, top managers included 
three indicators in their models that were not selected by the remaining two 
sets of managers while three other indicators were chosen by middle managers 
alone. Finally, no common indicators emerged between the two managerial levels 
(top and middle) in the petrochemical company. 
In total, the results suggest that perceptions of strengths and weaknesses 
indicators can be expected to vary among three managerial levels. As noted pre-
viously, perceptions of internal strengths and weaknesses are a critical input 
to a firm's strategy formulation process. The fact that indicators used to 
identify strengths and weaknesses may not be consistent among managers is signi-
ficant. A firm's strengths represent those capabiltities that can become 
disinctive competencies--that is, what the firm can do better relative to its 
competitors. Hofer and Schendel 0978) suggest that distinctive competencies 
must be exploited to gain a competive advantage. 
Once identified, a firm's strength must be nurtured for it to become a 
distinctive competence. This is accomplished through a concentration of organi-
zational resources (Kiechel, 1982; Yavitz and Newman, 1982; Hitt and Ireland, 
1984). Such an emphasis would be virtually impossible, however, if managers at 
different levels in a firm do not agree on the indicators that reflect the 
firm's strengths and weaknesses. Efforts to form distinctive competencies con-
sistent with each managerial level's perception of the world would result in 
misallocations of resources (and in turn, would impact negatively on financial 
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performance). Thus, these results suggest that managers' schemas and biases may 
affect the formation of distinctive competencies. 
Variances in perceptions of environmental uncertainty among managerial levels 
Research evidence suggests that perceptions of the degree of uncertainty in 
a firm's environment affect a firm's actions (Emery and Trist, 1965; Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1967). Among the actions affected are those involved with strate-
gic planning processes (Lindsay and Rue, 1980; Boulton et al., 1982), a firm's 
strategic norms (Dirsmith and Covaleski, 1983) and patterns of influence that 
form within an organization (Hrebiniak and Snov, 1980). Given this evidence, 
coupled with the nature of this study's sample, it was expected that perceptions 
of environmental uncertainty would vary among managers in different firms. 
Further, evidence that uncertainty perceptions differ by administrative 
hierarchial level (Cox et al., 1978) and indications that our perceptions of 
today's environmental conditions are often thought to be highly consistent with 
conditions identified in previous work experiences (Kielser and Sproul, 1982) 
suggested that these perceptions would be different among top, middle and lower 
level managers. 
Managers in the three firms studied reflected a significant difference in 
the perception of only one dimension (clients) of environmental uncertainty. 
This finding may suggest similarities in the external environmental conditions 
faced by the three firms or that the differences are more systematic across 
management levels than across firms. 
The results showed differences in perceptions of environmental uncertainty 
among individuals in different managerial levels, providing support for the 
second hypothesis. This suggests that managers' cognitive schemas do affect 
one's perceptions of how much uncertainty is in the firm's environment. 
Overall, lower level managers perceived significantly greater amounts of uncer-
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tainty as compared to those at the middle level, but not as compared to top 
level managers. Thus, the heuristics used by lower level managers, and the 
kinds of information available to them, may influence perceptions of environ-
mental uncertainty differently than those of middle level managers. 
This finding is also of interest in light of Thompson's 0967) work. 
Thompson suggested that organizations attempt to seal off, or buffer their fech-
nical cores from environmental disturbances. This is intended to increase effi-
ciency. These results may reflect a failure to buffer the cores in the three 
firms studied. The moderating effect of PEU on the perceptions of important 
strengths and weakness indicators was minimal and was thus considered to be of 
little consequence. 
The practical implications of these results are obvious. Those involved in 
strategy formulation processes should recognize the possibility that managers' 
cognitive schemas may affect their perceptions of uncertainty in external 
environments. Once recognized, efforts could be initiated to determine cogni-
tive elements contributing to the schemas and actions that are appropriate to 
deal with these realities. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The normative model of strategy formulation holds that the process starts 
with the assessment of a firm's internal strengths and weaknesses and its exter-
nal opportunities and threats. While other perspectives exist, the normative 
model has undoubtedly been the most popular. 
The present study examined the actual assessment of strengths and weaknesses 
and environmental uncertainty by individual mana·gers at various levels in an 
organization. First, the reseachers established, on the basis of recent 
research in cognitive psychology and results from organizational theory, that 
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there are reasons to expect assessments of both the firm and its environment 
to vary systematically as a function of organizational level. Second, these 
expectations were formalized as hypotheses and were tested in a sample of three 
firms using managers with input to or involvement in the strategic planning pro-
cess. A "policy capturing" approach to these tests was used to circumvent the 
problems associated with "espoused theories" as opposed to "theories in use''. 
The statistical tests confirmed that perceptions of strengths and weaknesses and 
enviromental uncertainty do vary systematically as a function of organizational 
level. 
These results have far reaching consequences for both research and practice 
in strategic management. From a practical point of view two issues are of imme-
diate concern. First, should the normative model be discarded in favor of an 
alternative (what alternative?), given the ambiguous nature of assessments of 
the firm and its enviroment? Second, what is meant by "strengths and 
weaknesses" and "opportunities and threats"? Operationally, these terms are 
partially dependent on theJ level of management doing the assessment. The 
assessment cannot be divorced from the assessor. This issue cuts directly to 
the design of strategic planning systems and processes. Should systems be 
designed to focus on the union or the intersection or some other set of 
assessments? Can assessments be weighted and combined? How much and what kind 
of input should be sought from the various levels of managers? Questions such 
as these, largely absent in the normative model, become highly salient in light 
of the currrent research. 
From a research perspective the current paper raises several interesting 
issues. Among these are the fact that these results call into question the use 
of questionnaire approaches when conducting strategy research, wherein typically 
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a single manager is asked to respond to questions about a firm, its strategy, 
its planning process, or its environment. Such studies obviously run a substan-
tial risk of measuring the perceptions of a sample of individuals rather than 
the characteristics under study. But then one is still left with the philo-
sophical issue of the "true" response, given the difficulty of separating the 
assessment from the assessor. 
An interesting research issue is the partition of the variance in percep-
tions of a particular variable such as strengths. For example, how much of it 
is due to industry effects, firm effects, managerial level, functional spe-
cialty, and individuual differences? In this context, the current work is 
merely a specialized study that raises the more general issue. 
Overall the research reported herein suggests that much more investigation 
is needed in the general area of perception and cognition. How do managers 
involved in strategy formulation processes perceive and conceptualize important 
issues? What are the relationships between perceptions, conception and reality? 
How do schemas vary across firms and across managerial levels in a particular 
firm? Can "objective" approaches to strategic management, independent of the 
particular manager, be developed? These and related questions raise vital 
issues that are as yet only modestly understood and in need of substantial 
study. 
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Tbc intere,;t and abilities dc:monstrate:d by top 
management 
The standard operatiQg procedures 
The control system 
The planning system 
Employee activities 
The technical abilities of er~oloyees 
The number of emplovees 
·The abilities of employees 
Knm.r.lcdge of clients' nN•ds 
Product quality 
Services provided to client~ 





The price-t!arning:; index 
Distributioil channels 
Re-lations \-:ith labor uninns 
Information on market share 
Table 2 
Sample Case With Instruction$ 
Effectiveness Indicators 
The purpose of this section is to obtain your rating of 
the effectiveness of 30 hypothetical firms. Different infor-
mation will be presented to you which '..rill help you in the 
dete~mination of the effectiveness of ea~h firm. It is expected 
that an "effective" firm is considerably· different than an 
"ineffective" firm according to the terms of the presented 
information. A good distribution of effective, partially 
effective, and ineffective firms are included. 
Instructions: Assume that a managerial audit h<ts been con-
ducted in each one of the 30 firms to analyze their strengths 
and weaknesses. 
The resulting data is presented in the form of a five 
point scale (from poor to excellent) as ranked bv the auditors. 
Pleasti ·; read each one of the audit rcoorts. <.:.f.>n~ider the l!l!'or-
mati,m given for that particul.:tr finn and ev;1iuate i.t:=; ef[~ct­
i'\•.:.:t1ess Pll the seven point seal.; located at the end of the re-
port. The1·e arc 30 firms; therefore, mc.:tsurP ym!t· t imc, ..:onsiJcr 
the .inform:lti,)n before noting yuur judbmcnt and utilize the most 
adequate point in the scale. 
Example: If you consider that one of the firms \.;ras particularly 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 
effective 
Should you consider another finn Vl.'ry l.•ffecllVL'., put: an X .in 
the blank space to the far right, as r ..... llows: 
very 





Firms with HVl~ragc l'ffl'<.:.tivcness may he (~v:-~lu;~tcd thr,mgh 
the use of one of the central blank spaces. 
General Information About the 
-----. Si:nulated Firms: 
In order to assist in the evaluation of the simulated firms 
the following must be assumed: 
{I 
Table 2 Continued 
1) Each firm has essentially identical managerial objectives, 
clients, external environment, etc. 
2) Since the audit reports contain data about _h_o_v, _w_e_l_l the 
firm performs various activities (but not which activities 
in particular), assume that each fi·rm performs activities 
very similar to those of your firm~ 
3) Remember that the information given in the audit report 
is in the form of poor. regular, etc. 
Firm·n 
Audit Report 
Poor Bad Average Good · Excellent 
1 2 J 4 5 
1. The organizational 
form and structure _L 
2. The interest and abilities 
demonstrated by top 
management _L 
3. The standard operating 
procedures _L 
4. The control system 
..1L 
s. The planning system _L 
6. Employee activities _L 
7. The t t•chn i ctl ah iIi t .ies. 
or •'1111' I ll)'l'l' S X 
8. The numbe r o f 
e::1ployees X . 
9. The .::~bil ities of 
sales personnel _L 
10. Knowledge of 
clients' needs __x_ 
11. Product qu.::~lity _L 
- -'--'--·--- --- - - --- - · ·- - - ------ - - -
Table 2 Continued 
.-\udlt R.:·r-o~rt 
Poor ·Bad Average Good E:-:cellent 
l 2 3 4 5 
12. Services provided 
to clients X 
13. The industrial plant (size, energy, 
equipment, etc.) 
_x_ 
14. Production techniques X 
15. Product development 
_x_ 
16. Financing capacity 
_x_ 
17. The price-earnings 
index 
_L 
18. Growth tendencies X 
19. Distribution channels X 
20. Relations with labor 
unions X 
21. The information about 
market share X 
Please rate the effectiveness of this firm on the following scale 
by placing an X above the appropriate number. 
Very 



























- . 321 - .346 
- . 147 . 118 
.113 
Table 3 
lntercorrel ation Mntrix for Strength and W~akness I ndica t ors 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
. 022 -.206 -.015 .058 -.036 - . 099 .231 -.042 .080 -.142 
. 017 -.012 . 124 . 081 - . 012 . 043 .034 -. 023 -.087 - . 046 
. 046 . 027 - . 246- . 134 ,- .010 . 099 .076 . 139 -.211 . 252 
.202 - .273 . 089 .202 .136 -. 11 3 .030 -.130 -.031 . 016 
-. 207 .317 .108 . 301 - .23S .156 . 0:'8 .018 . 056 
- . 178 - .172 - . 180 . 085 -.490 -. 277 - . 136 .309 
-. 043 .258 -. 054 - .173 - .103 .060 - . 002 
- . 31 2 . ~ 25 -.050 - . 083 .1 24 - .006 
- . 372 -.127 - .192 . 141 - . 106 
.1 45 . 180 . 148 - .136 
.411 . 11 7 -. 157 
.131 - . 030 
- .1 74 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
-.085 .270 -. on - .162 .423 - .242 - .1)9 
-.225 - .109 . 385 - . 300 . 256 -.13 2 . J 2: 
-.062 . 179 . 076 . 030 - . 223 . 263 . 3 tl ~ 
- . 334 -. 182 . 024 .073 -.453 -. 170 - .05• 
. 122 .250 -. 117 - .Q04 . 130 .071 - . 1)(,_ 
. 228 -. 341 . 163 -. 275 . 076 .098 -. :Ji; 
-. 108 - . 099 - . 34S -. 174 . 316 -.166 • 2:.:. ;-_ 
-. 235 . 116 .1 Sit . 0)3 -. 223 - .053 - . J> 
-. 217 . 204 -. 150 -. 206 - . 046 - .016 . : 1 '1 ~ 
. 113 - . 08 7 . 290 - . 004 - . 187 -.1 99 ' 0 . 0 ... I. .. -
.234 .074 .0~8 . 187 . 027 -. 304 . Jsc l _ 
• 284 .1 75 - .350 . 133 . 153 . 241 0 11 t":. l -
.254 .071 - .189 - . E7 - . 03.:. - .Ooo 
. 213 - . 206 - .011 -.009 . 022 -. 044 - .o:.s 1-
.008 -.045 - . 100 . 122 . 118 - . 08~ l 
-.150 . 026 -. 095 . o1s -. o~ s 1 
-.308 . 063 -. 127 . (1.;5 1 
- .loY - . 053 . 012 l 
-.'0!.1 .l l c 1 
-. ~0~ 2 
2 
Table 4 
Regression Hodt'l of Si~ni.fic :mt Jndicators For 
Internal Assessment-Overall Sample 
S t rt'n)! 1·h & \\'<~akness 











118 • 07 
17 -.06 
F = 75.20** 
d. f. = 13,1636 

















Regress.ion Models of Strength and Weakness 
Indicators for Each of the Three Management 
Levels 
- -·- ··-- ·----- -·- -- ...... -- ... --Top Middle 
Strength & Weakness 1-fa.nagement ~tanagement 
Indicators 
*P <.os 

































F = 23.26** 
d. f ~ = 11,348 
R • .43 









F = 47.7R** 















F = 4S.54•i 
d. f.= 10,559 
R2= .45 
Table 10 
Moderated Regression Analysis with 
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